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¶1 MR. LEV:  We're going to get started again for the final panel. 
¶2 I'd like to again thank Foley & Lardner for being the Premier sponsor of this event.  
There will be a reception immediately afterward so I won't say anything else at the end.  
But just one word. I'd also really like to thank Jones Day and Ben Bai for being here as 
well from Dallas, because they're sponsoring this particular panel. 
¶3 If you're here getting CLE credit, this is important, in order to get the CLE credit 
we need you to fill out those two forms that you got in your CLE materials and either 
give them to me or Jodie, who is in the back of the room, or just leave them on the table 
in the Atrium where you registered, and we'll make sure that your certificates get e-
mailed to you. 
¶4 So without any other words I'll leave it to Professor Ho to start the panel. 
¶5 MS. HO:  Hi, Everybody, and thanks for sticking with us on a beautiful Friday 
afternoon in Chicago.  I think we've got a really exciting panel, so I'm happy that you're 
all with us. 
¶6 I don't want to spend a long time on introduction of speakers because I want to 
leave plenty of time for their presentations and discussions, so let me just briefly 
introduce you to our speakers and sort of the general topics. 
¶7 We're basically building upon what we talked about in the last panel.  The last 
panel we got sort of a detailed overview generally of the laws in the various BRIC 
countries, so what we're going to do in this panel is move more towards enforcement 
issues.  So I've got three panelists to talk about three slightly different issues. 
¶8 We've got Benjamin Bai from Jones Day who is going to first talk about 
infringement and enforcement using China as a case study. 
¶9 And then Keith Lindenbaum from Foley & Lardner is going to talk about 
enforcement in BRIC countries in generally. 
¶10 And finally Yi Qian is going to talk about I think mostly China. 
¶11 MS. QIAN:  Actually, most general. 
¶12 MS. HO:  General again, but I think the real distinction that she's going to bring is 
an economic perspective. 
¶13 So I think we're going to have a really interesting discussion here amongst our 
panelists, and then finally we'll open it up for discussion. 
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*** Panel speaker.  Ms. Qian is an assistant professor in marketing at Northwestern University Kellogg 
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**** Panel moderator.  Ms. Ho is an associate professor of law at Loyola University Chicago School of 
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¶14 So obviously we've got both practicing attorneys with global IP experience, as well 
as an academic perspective. 
¶15 So without further ado, I'll let Benjamin get started. 
¶16 MR. BAI:  Thank you, Cynthia. 
¶17 Let's do something fun here because you're tired.  You're thinking, "Gosh, how am 
I going to sit through this next hour, especially when Professor gets up and talks about 
economic theory." Let's do a show of hands.  How many of you have heard China has IP 
enforcement problems, raise your hands. 
¶18 (A show of hands.) 
¶19 MR. BAI:  You haven't heard?  Anyone else? You haven't heard China has got IP 
problems? Everyone, right? 
¶20 I'm not going to ask -- please keep your hands up.  I'm not going to ask you to tell 
me who has personally enforced IP, because I know there are law students here, so the 
question is who has personally enforced IP or heard of someone who personally enforced 
IP, keep your hands up. 
¶21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:  In China? 
¶22 MR. BAI:  Sorry? 
¶23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:  In China? 
¶24 MR. BAI:  Yes.  I'm talking about China.  Okay.  Look around.  There are still 
quite a few hands here.  So what are the results?  Did you lose or did you win? 
¶25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:  Win. 
¶26 MR. BAI:  You won.  What about the rest of the hands? 
¶27 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:  I think it's an ongoing process still. 
¶28 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:  We lost, but not in court.  There were government 
officials involved and they covered the whole thing so we couldn't even sue. 
¶29 MR. BAI:  They covered the whole thing.  Let's talk about that. The reality is a lot 
of people have heard of problems, enforcement problems in China, but I will have data to 
show you that not a whole lot of people went into China and enforced their IP. 
¶30 Rule No. 1, IP rights are private rights.  If you don't enforce your rights, you should 
not cry foul on the sideline.  This is true in the U.S., this is true in China, and anywhere 
else in the world.  Rule No. 2, subject to some exceptions, IP rights are territorial, 
especially patent rights. 
¶31 Copyrights are different.  You know, China is a member of the Berne Convention 
so you can have copyrights created here and enforceable in China, which people have 
done. 
¶32 Trademark, sort of halfway in between. If you don't have a patent in China, you 
can't complain these guys are infringing your patents.  In fact, I made a lot of money by 
clients who came to me and said five years ago, "I didn't file a patent application in 
China, now these bad guys are knocking me off."  Instead of going into China to enforce 
a patent, we had to come up with a very complicated scheme to enforce their rights.  How 
to do it?  Because if you have a patented component made in China where you don't have 
a patent right, when you import it into the U.S. I can file an ITC proceeding, I can sue 
them in District Court.  But do you know how expensive that is?  An average patent 
litigation case going from start to finish going through trial, $3.5 million.  In China I can 
do it for half a million dollars for a very complicated case.  So this is sort of the reality. 
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¶33 If you don't file in China, then there is -- when it comes to time to enforce your 
rights it is very expensive.  And also they make things in China and then ship it around 
the world, you have to file also in Korea, Japan, Germany, France and U.S., and you 
know what, only the good old United States has broad discovery procedures.  So what 
you ended up having is in most jurisdictions you don't have discovery, you don't have 
evidence of infringement, you can't even get into court.  But if you had filed a patent 
application in China, you would have solved all these problems. 
¶34 With that background, let me get into my presentation.  Julie Lee laid a very good 
foundation for my speech, so I'm not going to repeat what she said.  In China it has a two 
track enforcement system, which is unique.  In the U.S. you only go to courts, other than 
customs agencies which are ineffective, as ineffective as Chinese customs.  You almost 
have no hope of finding infringing goods just because there are so many shipments 
coming in and out. 
¶35 In China you can go to various agencies for trademark, copyright and patent 
infringement, and the vast majority of these cases, administrative cases involve Chinese 
parties just because most foreign parties don't know about it.  It is actually quite effective 
if it is simple cases. 
¶36 What Wall Street Journal or New York Times didn't tell you is in 2005 China 
became the largest, the most litigious country in the world for IP disputes.  This is sort of 
the double digit growth that they saw in terms of IP suits filed in Chinese courts, these are 
courts of first instance. While the economy is going through double digit growth, so are 
their lawsuits. 
¶37 I'm not going to go through all these statistics.  Just look at 2005 because this is sort 
of the watershed year for China.  China saw 13,000-and-some lawsuits, whereas United 
States saw about 11,000.  There are a similar number of patent cases.  I'm a patent lawyer 
and I specialize in patent cases, so these cases are more interesting to me. 
¶38 One shocking statistic is that of 13,000 cases, there are only less than 300 cases that 
involved foreign litigants, defendants as well as plaintiffs.  Now, you can draw the 
conclusion.  The whole world says China doesn't protect IP, so this perception became 
reality and people don't go into China and enforce their rights.  As private rights, how can 
you even cry foul when you don't enforce your own rights?  I've said enough so I'm not 
going to repeat this. 
¶39 Also on the legislative front, China has seven forms of IP crimes.  I'm not going to 
read through my slides, and you don't need to read it either because it is Friday afternoon, 
4:00.  To summarize, for certain serious cases of copyright, trademark infringement cases 
it is criminal.  The seriousness is defined by the number of copies or economic losses you 
cause -- that infringers have caused to the rights holder.  If that is the case, then it is 
criminal, and each year 300-some people were sentenced to jail for IP infringement. 
¶40 Now, let me compare this to the United States.  How many people went to jail last 
year for IP crime?  I would say no more than ten. 
¶41 So United States filed a WTO complaint about what?  About this IP criminal code.  
There are two complaints.  One is market access, which has nothing to do with IP.  
Another is pretty much copyright issues.  They were complaining about the threshold for 
criminal -- the criminal statute to kick in is instead of 1,000 copies.  If you sold more than 
1,000 copies then some of these codes will kick in. 
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¶42 The Chinese Supreme Court just issued an interpretation about a week before this 
complaint was filed, and lowered from 1,000 to 500.  That was not good enough for the 
USTR.  They said, "Well, you know, there is still a safe harbor because if someone sold 
499 then he's not criminal.  Well, yes, he's not criminal, but there are civil remedies. 
¶43 I debated yesterday in Washington, DC, with the USTR on this issue.  I said these 
laws are TRIPS compliant.  So if there is any TRIPS scholars here, I'm willing to debate 
with any one of you. These laws are more than TRIPS compliant.  It has got more -- 
basically China has gone further than the United States.  I actually challenge anyone to 
find similar criminal codes in the United States.  I challenged the USTR to find me codes, 
and he said, "Yes, we do.  In the U.S. we do."  But he couldn't quote me the sections, so 
you draw conclusions. 
¶44 All right.  Let me talk about some of the fun stuff.  How do you sue?  They're only 
two years of the statute of limitations, so you've got to do it very quickly and it is a 
known or should have known standard.  So if you don't do it, two years go by real 
quickly.  There are ways to toll this statute of limitations.  This is a very quirky Chinese 
law.  I don't think I have time and I'm not going to explain this, how to do it. 
¶45 There are declaration of non-infringement, which are similar to DJ actions. So 
instead of being a defendant you could bring a lawsuit to be a plaintiff. 
¶46 In China there are two instance court systems.  The first instance is a trial court 
with appeal goes to the second instance.  IP cases are mostly started in intermediate 
courts with appeal as a matter of right goes to the higher court.  There are cases where 
you can file in the High People's Court as the first instance case and with appeal going to 
the Chinese Supreme Court.  The reason sometimes you want to do that is for -- to avoid 
bias and maybe if you want more sophisticated judges to handle your case. 
¶47 Also I say this to you:  The justices in the IP court on the Chinese Supreme Court 
are more educated than some of our judges.  They speak English really well, they have 
electrical engineering degree.  I have currently a case before the Beijing Higher Court, 
and normally there are three judges who hear cases, and two of them have technical 
backgrounds.  The lead judge has an electrical engineering background.  My case relates 
to telecommunications, so I actually feel comfortable because I'm representing the 
defendant and I know if I get a sophisticated judge we have a shot. 
¶48 Venues are similar so I'm going to skip to what you're familiar with.  Forum 
shopping is extremely important.  If you ended up in a wrong forum, you have no chance 
of winning, just like if you ended up a lawsuit in Angleton, Texas, you have no chance of 
winning either.  You probably don't know where Angleton, Texas, is.  That is where 
Merck lost its Vioxx trial.  I guess it's a bad joke or it is just a Friday afternoon. 
¶49 Rules of evidence.  This is where, this is where the problems come from.  It is not 
that China doesn't protect IP.  China needs to revamp its rules of evidence of civil 
procedure.  A lot of people are barking up the wrong trees saying you got to amend your 
patent law or trademark law, but to enforce IP you've got to get into Chinese courts and 
you got have to evidence, right?  There is no discovery, and the plaintiff has the burden to 
prove infringement.  If you don't have a case, you can't file a complaint and say, "I'm 
going to do discovery.  I think I've met my Rule 11 obligation so I'm going to do 
discovery.  There is no discovery to be had."  If you don't have it now, you're not going to 
get it later.  That is the problem. 
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¶50 So a lot of cases where we know these guys are infringing, but we have a copy 
from our friends who works there and he showed us the drawings, we knew these guys 
are infringing, but with this evidence you can't go into court because that's not original.  
The Chinese courts demand original. 
¶51 The rules of evidence are drafted with these fundamental thesis, that people cannot 
be trusted and given the chance they will lie and don't trust any experts because they can 
be bought, their opinions are worthless.  So when you bring two experts to fight in 
Chinese courts, guess what, they hire their own expert.  They disregard your experts and 
they hire their own expert. 
¶52 Oral testimonies are almost given no weight, so that's why you can't drag someone 
in and say, "I saw this guy do it."  It is not going to work. 
¶53 So those are the quirky aspects of rules of evidence in China that makes litigation 
extremely difficult.  Is it different from the rest of the world?  No.  Germany is exactly 
the same way.  I had cases in Germany, it is the same situation.  U.K. got some limited 
discovery that is helpful.  And the French similar to Germany except they have the 
seizure order.  China has the seizure order too, which I will get to. 
¶54 The point is there are systematic issues which don't relate to substantive law.  The 
substantive law is actually pretty good.  When it comes to procedure stuff, it is up to 
China to change it.  It is not up to us to cry foul.  And also it is up to us to understand it 
so we can help our clients to win, to navigate through these procedural hoops. 
¶55 How do you gather evidence if you have no discovery?  Well, this should not 
surprise you. You hire a private investigator.  It sounds like we're doing divorce cases.  
Or the more common way is if there is an infringing product on the market you do what's 
called a notarized purchase.  Any evidence in China is preferably -- should be preferably 
notarized.  And then you can use criminal proceedings or administrative proceedings first 
to discover some evidence. 
¶56 Police in China have unlimited power. Let me emphasize this word unlimited.  So 
nobody can do discovery, but they can do discovery.  So if your case rose to the level of 
criminal offenses, then get the police involved.  That means you've got to build a 
relationship years before this thing happened.  If, say, you don't pay attention to the 
police and all of a sudden you have a problem, you go there and say, "Take this $50,000 
and please help me."  It doesn't work. 
¶57 I'm kidding.  You can't bribe. 
¶58 The most powerful one is evidence preservation.  It is similar to the French seizure 
order.  You go to court and you say, "Your Honor, these guys may destroy evidence if 
you don't issue an order, if you don't go there and preserve evidence."  And normally they 
will do it and that's how you can get evidence. 
¶59 I'm going to skip all this procedural stuff and I will show you a couple cases where 
international companies have won in China.  Julie had a couple references to Starbucks 
and 3M cases, which I'm also familiar with, but I just want to have a couple more cases to 
actually show you. 
¶60 Hansgrohe makes high-end bath and shower products.  They are extremely 
successful in China. They sued this infringer in China and this is the result.  They asked 
for -- because their damages, their loss is not huge in China, so they asked for 500,000 
RMB and they got 334,000 RMB.  This is about 70 percent of what they asked for.  
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Anyone who litigates in the U.S. knows if you get 70 percent of what you ask for, that's a 
damn good result.  I'm not going to get into the detail. 
¶61 Another one is a very famous trademark and copyright infringement case that 
involves ETS and GMAC.  Beijing New Oriental School is a school that prepares 
students to take those GRE, GMAT, and TOEFL exams.  Some of the students from 
China they almost got perfect scores.  It's all because of the good work done by Beijing 
New Oriental School. Years ago they went to ETS and GMAC and asked for a license, 
and they were told to go to hell.  So they said, "Okay, I'm just going to copy."  So they 
did, and they got slammed with about a million dollar judgment for copyright and 
trademark infringement. The appeal -- the appellate court said, well, there is not really 
copyright -- there is not really trademark infringement because it is a fair use. I'm not 
going to get into why they did it.  But copyright infringement, yes.  So they shaved the 
damages award by 30 percent. 
¶62 This still represents one of the largest damages award in China for IP infringement 
that involves foreign parties.  700,000, not bad by the Chinese standard. 
¶63 The point is, in fact judges told me, privately and publicly Chinese judges say that. 
Give me the right evidence, I will award $100 million, but you've got to prove it.  The 
difficulty lies that there is no discovery in China, so how do you prove that.  And if 
you're not in China, operating in China, then you really don't have a loss.  Your loss is 
theoretical. 
¶64 Just like Microsoft claimed that they lost billions of dollars due to piracy.  That's a 
theoretical loss too. 
¶65 Okay.  Talking about a software company. Autodesk is extremely successful in 
China.  The reason why is they go after everyone who infringes their software.  It is 
easier for them to do because they sell high-end software.  It is CAD, auto CAD. It is 
worth a lot of money, it used by architectural firms, so it is easy to target these 
companies. 
¶66 The result?  They asked for -- in this case essentially they got almost what they 
asked for, so that's really pretty good, and they also got some litigation expenses as well. 
¶67 So all these cases demonstrate that if you know how to litigate in China, with the 
right evidence you can win.  Nothing is easy in China. Doing business in China is not 
easy.  This go to China and get rich quick scheme is not going to work, but if you 
understand the system and you have to adapt from U.S. or European mentality to this 
Chinese unique legal system you are going to do well. 
¶68 And with that I'll end my speech and thank you for your attention. 
¶69 (Applause.) 
¶70 MR. LINDENBAUM:  Thank you all so much for staying until the end of the day. 
¶71 I'm going to start off with the conclusion just in case we don't get there.  I'm going 
to tell a story.  My son, who is now getting ready to go to college, when he went into high 
school we got him his own computer that he could use in his own room.  We gave it with 
one caveat, being the intellectual property attorney that I am, that he could do no file-to-
file sharing for MP3 files for music.  You would think that we had punished him beyond 
reproach.  That they ought to call in social services for this sort of decree in our house.  A 
tantrum like we hadn't seen since he was about three.  How could you?  Everybody does 
it, was his biggest defense.  Though I stuck to my guns, and what did we do?  We bought 
 530
Vol. 5:3] Benjamin J. Bai et al. 
him an I-Pod.  Along comes I-Tunes and everybody is happy.  Parents and relatives and 
grandparents give him I-Tune gift cards for the holidays and he's happy. 
¶72 The lesson here, I'm going to suggest, is that we need to look for alternative 
economic models.  We do it here in the U.S.  We can do it in the BRICs.  You heard 
Benjamin Bai talk about the wonderful enforcement in China, so you would think that 
there would no more infringement, that it would all go away.  But the fact is that there is 
more to -- there is more to enforcement than just having a good legal system and having a 
good court. 
¶73 I'm going to talk about seven strategies.  The first one is the legal structure. You 
have to have this.  This is sort of a cornerstone.  You have to have a fundamental legal 
structure.  For me to argue to my son that he can't do it, it has to be against the law, that 
was successful, at least on my end. 
¶74 Sanctions and coercion.  We in the U.S. use sanctions and coercion.  We've used it 
historically to force all the BRIC members, Brazil, Russia, India and China, to adopt the 
Paris Convention, Berne, TRIPS.  And we're still using coercion today.  Just this week 
the U.S. announced tariffs on glossy paper coming out of China, and of course we filed a 
complaint with the WTO which will play out. 
¶75 Enforcement.  You have to have enforcement.  If you can't enforce your rights, this 
is key. 
¶76 But these three things alone are not enough.  Publicity.  You have to be able to 
publicize your company, the good things your company is doing and the fact that 
enforcement here has a public benefit. 
¶77 Education and training has to start at a very young level.  You know, we again 
asked the question of our school where we sent our son, "Do you educate that stealing 
MP3 files is wrong?"  Of course the answer there is no.  You'll see in China they have an 
eighth grade program directed towards education for piracy. 
¶78 Corporate citizenship.  You need to view if -- for our corporate clients we counsel 
them that if you're going to be in China you should be perceived positively and that will 
help you a long way to get the public and government on your side. 
¶79 And finally the conclusion, alternative economic models.  There must be an 
alternative economic model that makes sense.  I think it will work not only in the 
software and MP3, but it will work in pharmaceuticals and other areas as well. 
¶80 Okay.  Legal Structure.  Paris Convention goes back to 1883.  Before 1883 you had 
to file your patent in all countries simultaneously around the world.  Now if you're a 
member of the Paris Convention you can file in one country and have one year to file in 
others.  The Berne Convention covers copyright materials and was adopted in 1886.  
TRIPS, more recently in 1994, this addressed the question of uniformity.  Just because 
you have patent laws doesn't mean that they're uniform, and if you don't protect certain 
types of rights that doesn't make all that much of a difference.  And finally you have to 
have penalties, you have to have some bite to these laws, both civil and criminal. 
¶81 Let's talk a little about sanctions and the effectiveness of sanctions and coercion.  
We'll talk about an example in each one of the BRIC countries. 
¶82 Russia.  You know, we're still using, by the way, the idea of sanction and coercion 
with Russia, arguing with them and negotiating with them over WTO.  If you look at the 
list of who is on the WTO, really Russia is one of the few really more industrialized 
countries that is not a member of the WTO, and a large issue of contention has been IP 
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rights.  So we've used this WTO carrot as sort of a way of inducing Russia to improve its 
IP position. 
¶83 India.  We throw out a loss of aid, and they've adopted to TRIPS.  China.  We've 
had this cycle of threat and sanctions and tariffs with China for a number of rounds now.  
It turns out that we'll threaten China, as we did, or impose tariffs.  China will threaten to 
impose tariffs back.  And then there will be some negotiation, and then we end up with an 
agreement, and then the infringement continues. 
¶84 In Brazil there has been pressure to protect pharmaceuticals in the 1980s.  And this 
was -- because they didn't, we applied tariffs, they countered with other tariffs on things 
that matter to our industries.  Like Xerox, Dow, Ford and Carrier all complained on the 
tariff that the U.S. imposed.  The U.S. imposed tariffs on Brazilian industry and that 
comes back to hurt the U.S. because we have our products manufactured in Brazil. 
¶85 So now let's take a look at -- in terms of fosters retaliation, China is a good example 
of this, as I mentioned.  So this week, as I said, we placed tariffs on glossy paper, about 
21 percent. What do you think the response will be?  Do you think that China will 
immediately address whatever the grievance is of the U.S. or do you think they'll begin to 
formulate tariffs of their own?  I'm going to guess that they're going to begin to formulate 
tariffs of their own. 
¶86 We filed a complaint in the WTO.  Do you think that China won't look for other 
reasons to file their own complaint in the WTO?  I'm going to guess that they're going to 
do the same.  There will be some negotiations, there will be some settlement, and the 
infringement will go on. 
¶87 You know, this last point here that's on the slide.  Beside the -- even if sanctions are 
effective in getting the government to say they're going to do things and to pass certain 
laws, unless you address the underlying reasons for piracy and counterfeiting, and that is 
poverty, unemployment, and in the issue of pharmaceuticals it's a moral imperative, 
you're not going to solve the problem. 
¶88 Again, I think that an alternative economic model is really what's going to be key 
here in winning over and asserting rights in the various countries. 
¶89 Let's talk about enforcement.  These examples are put out by the IIPLA.  The 
IIPLA puts out a report every year, the International Intellectually Property Alliance.  
They estimated that there were $13 trillion worth of trade losses in the U.S. due to piracy 
of software and copyright-related materials.  Brazil, $158 million, Russia $1.7 trillion.  
So it's significant numbers. 
¶90 The motivation for these numbers I think is clear.  In India you have 8,000 pending 
cases, 70 convictions in 2006.  So even though India may have robust laws on the book 
and a mechanism for enforcement, if you only have 70 convictions you can sense that 
something else is at work here. 
¶91 The statistics for Russia.  3,400 individuals convicted of copyright infringement of 
which five served a prison term.  This one I think is somewhat suspect, as Benjamin 
pointed.  We have ten people in prison from the U.S. and I don't know that this number is 
particular relevant. 
¶92 Let's talk about the strategy of publicity.  Example, this is Heinz Corporation in 
China.  They had companies that copied their delivery trucks, copied their uniforms, and 
copied their product.  What did they do?  First of all they worked with local enforcement 
agencies, the local government to go in and raid these companies.  What they did is they 
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paid reporters to cover these raids to try to give publicity and visibility to the governing 
agencies that were actually doing their job. 
¶93 Coupled with that they had a public campaign that talked about not the importance 
of intellectual property but rather spoke to the importance of public safety.  The baby 
formula of these companies was unregulated, wasn't safe, not necessarily following the 
appropriate formula.  They appealed to the public safety concepts within the citizenship, 
and have had a lot of success using this -- this strategy. 
¶94 Education and training.  Just because you have laws on the books doesn't 
necessarily mean that people know what they need to do.  My son being an example.  Not 
educated that this is an important quality, an important feature.  And I think that if we 
raise all of our children that it is okay to copy MP3 files, what will happen when they go 
to college and become members of corporate boards or corporations?  What will be their 
ethics and ethos in making decisions about whether or not to copy? 
¶95 So you have to educate not only your government agencies but your citizenship as 
well. And China, I think to their credit here, has a middle school program entitled "Say 
No to Piracy, Starting With Me."  Reminiscent of our "Just Say No" to drugs.  But I think 
you need to start fairly young.  Obviously it's going to be quite a long time before these 
eighth graders will be in positions of corporations that will make decisions, but I think 
you need to start when they're this young in order to have an impact. 
¶96 Here is an example of a telecommunications company in China taking a strategy of 
donating to local charities.  Here they had a publicity campaign that they were committed 
to China, that they were going to invest locally in China, and they began to educate 
people in that. 
¶97 It sort of reminds me of the Japanese car companies in this country.  I worked 
before I went to law school in Detroit where we had -- where the Japanese car companies 
were not viewed highly. But what did they do?  They came in and built plants in this 
country.  They hired local workers.  So it took the union -- beside the fact that they were 
not all unionized, it took away the argument that there was no benefit to Americans for 
buying Japanese. And, of course, today we see the Japanese car companies are very 
successful, and I think that many of us do not feel that when we buy Japanese we're 
somehow unpatriotic because we are supporting jobs in the south and wherever they have 
plants. 
¶98 So this telecommunication company in China took the same sort of approach, 
investing in China, giving to local charities, making people feel that that company has 
Chinese interests at heart. 
¶99 I'm on the international business team at Foley & Lardner and my focus is Israel, so 
I spend a lot of time in Israel.  I bring this up as an example.  By the way, Israel, if you 
look at Priority Watch List, is often up there with the BRICs.  The "I" could be Israel or 
Ireland just as well as it could be India except the size is not as impressive.  But they do 
have the same sort of challenges, they're also a developing country trying to come up to 
Western standards. 
¶100 But recently U.S. Commerce Deputy David Sampson, this is February of this year, 
was in Israel, and during a visit he made a point of pointing out the companies that are 
doing business in Israel, and not the fact that they're doing business but their corporate 
citizenships, the charities that they run. 
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¶101 Let me go through these because they're interesting; they're all related to education. 
Microsoft has training for underprivileged youth in over 100 centers throughout the 
country using computers and using their system.  Intel has a program to introduce teens to 
high tech, to improve their advanced technology and self-esteem, but it's education based.  
Motorola, a program to promote education, technology training, advanced math classes.  
IBM has programs in poor schools.  Again, notice all education.  Cisco, after-school 
computer training programs in the underprivileged areas.  And this is not only something 
that the independent companies talk about but also our trade representatives talk about as, 
well, the idea that these companies want to create in the mind of Israelis that what is good 
for IBM is good for Israel. 
¶102 Let's talk about the alternative economic model, which is really what I want you to 
take away from here.  This is an example in Brazil, Nike.  Nike had the manufacturing 
rights for football jerseys for the Brazil football teams. And, of course, by football we 
mean soccer.  Nike came out with a shirt for 170 -- is Brazil dollars? Whatever the 
Brazilian currency is.  The pirated version was sold for 20.  So you can see the ratio is, 
what, eight, nine-fold.  When there is that gap it is difficult to convince anybody not to 
buy the pirated.  So what did they do?  They revamped their marketing.  They came up 
with a different jersey, a little simpler, a little less cost, and they put it at a price point that 
was only twice that of the pirated version and had great success.  I think you will find 
most populations with some education there will be a response to want to buy the official 
jersey as opposed to the pirated one, but that gap has to be reasonable. 
¶103 Okay.  So what's my conclusion?  The use of sanctions solely to create legal 
systems and enforcement is just not sufficient.  As long as the underlying problems 
remain that the gap between the pirated version and the non-pirated version is significant, 
we're going to find ourselves with continuous infringement problems in these countries. 
¶104 It requires a multifaceted approach. Cooperation with local and national 
government officials for government.  You have to have publicity in the right areas to 
support those efforts.  Enforcement in a positive way. Corporations must be actively 
involved in the communities through education and training and other sort of corporate 
citizenship efforts. 
¶105 And, finally, I think most importantly, like the example of I-Tunes, where we're no 
longer making kids buy entire albums but for $1 you can buy the song of your choice, 
you have to have an alternative economic business model that makes sense for the 
population and the group that you're trying to pursue. 
¶106 Thank you very much. 
¶107 (Applause.) 
¶108 MS. QIAN:  So thanks, Dan and Jodie, for inviting me here and for organizing this 
program. Thank you for the persistent people who stayed here and for the newcomers. 
¶109 So I would like to talk about economics of intellectual property rights and antitrust, 
and in particular I have three papers around this topic. One is a forthcoming paper in the 
Review of Economics and Statistics, whether patent protection -- domestic patent 
protection in the pharmaceutical sector could stimulate more domestic innovation using a 
cross-country analysis over two decades for about over 80 countries.  And then the 
second paper I will say a few words about is going from innovation to infringement, the 
flip side of IPR, which is counterfeits and imitations.  So I explore the pricing and 
marketing effects of counterfeits and imitations.  And then the final paper I have, which I 
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will not talk about, I will not have time to talk about in the presentation but I will be 
happy to talk about after the talk, is how to balance patenting and antitrust. 
¶110 So let's focus on the first paper first. The rationale for patent policies really focuses 
on that after we provide the promised ex post rewards for inventors then we could help to 
stimulate incentives to innovate ex ante.  However, there are numerous theoretical or 
practical counter arguments for that.  The ones I list here basically include Scotchmer and 
Green's paper discussing why patenting and intellectual property rights protection could 
stifle sequential innovation where innovations build upon each other.  And some other 
international scholars discuss that in the current environment where we have very 
sophisticated patent systems in the Western countries like U.S., U.K., et cetera, additional 
patent laws are not going to help stimulate anymore innovations.  And there are also case 
studies done on individual countries by Lerner and Jaffe, and others, how patent laws 
affected domestic innovation in each particular country, such as the U.S., Italy, Canada, 
et cetera. 
¶111 But the problem with these are that the empirical findings have been largely 
inconclusive, so some papers found that patent has positive stimulation effect but others 
find the opposite fact in Italy.  And by looking at the whole country in one paper you 
cannot generalize to the entire world, and that's what TRIPS agreements are trying do, is 
to generalize intellectual property rights to the whole world based on the assumption that 
patent laws have similar effects on stimulating innovation for different countries. 
¶112 That's where I pick up the research thread, whether national intellectual property 
rights protection is beneficial to developing countries. 
¶113 Now, the argument for implementing patent laws in developing countries is that it 
could somehow stimulate national patent -- national innovations in several ways.  One is 
that additional patent laws may provide favorable environment to try out innovations 
locally.  And another one is individuals had to switch from imitative activities to 
innovative activities once the country implements IP laws.  Perhaps the most heated 
debate comes from how much innovation could be stimulated, and the least controversial 
argument I came up by PhRMA was that because these developing countries currently 
who do not have patent laws may not have the market to stimulate innovation for these 
developing countries' specific diseases. 
¶114 So the argument is that after a group of countries who implement patent laws 
together they could provide more incentives for global innovation for these country-
specific diseases.  We haven't seen that so far, even after TRIPS has been implemented.  
And very little empirical research has been done for non-OECD countries, and that's why 
I tried to bring together a sample that contains both the developed countries and 
developing countries. 
¶115 In terms of methodology I'll go relatively brief, but just to highlight that. Because 
we cannot observe counterfactual outcomes of patent protection, that's what if the country 
did not implement their domestic patent law what would have happened; therefore, using 
international comparisons could provide important leverage.  So by comparing countries 
of similar characteristics besides domestic patent laws, any difference in their innovation 
outcome could mean more comfortably attributed to the patent law difference. 
¶116 So I begin with a rigorous study design to construct a database that approaches the 
ideal experimental data given the limitations of observational studies, meaning that the 
data I get is from tracing the historical data instead of doing a true experiment.  The way I 
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construct the database to approach experimental design is to use a matching algorithm to 
establish comparable country pairs to ease the reverse causality concern, which is 
sometimes called endogeneity.  Then I do panel analysis on the selected sample 
countries. 
¶117 So let me highlight the key findings, so that if I lose you in the next few slides at 
least you have the take-home lesson. 
¶118 National patent protection alone does not stimulate domestic innovation, as 
estimated by the citation-weighted U.S. patent count awarded to innovators in different 
countries.  And I also use alternative measures for innovation such as domestic R&D and 
exports in the pharmaceutical industry, that's how much Chinese pharmaceutical 
companies export to the U.S. market. 
¶119 Second, national pharmaceutical patent implementation seems to accelerate 
innovations in countries where they already have the innovative potential.  And the 
innovative potential is measured by higher development level, education attainment and 
economic freedom. 
¶120 And further, there appears to be an optimal level of intellectual property rights 
regulation above which further enhancement of protection reduces innovative activities.  
And I'll show you a figure showing that result. 
¶121 So basically these results are quite intuitive.  What it says is that any hope that we 
can base our innovations simply on patent systems is false hope.  What we really need is 
a combination of infrastructure, one piece of which could be a sound patent system, 
together with your innovative potential, that's your development level, education 
attainment, and economic freedom.  And it's important to balance your intellectual 
property rights regulations according to your country-specific needs. 
¶122 So here is a figure that shows.  The pink line is the complete sample countries and 
the blue line is highly enforced countries, and this traces out the innovativeness of these 
countries relative to the year they implemented their domestic pharmaceutical innovation, 
product innovation in particular.  So what you see is a downward slope trend for the 
highly enforced countries relative to the pink for the complete set. 
¶123 Let me just say a few words about how I overcome some practical limitations in 
drawing that causal inference.  First practical limitation in looking at the affects of patent 
protection on domestic innovation is that there is not a single time line when all the 
countries in the treated group, which is the newly patented group, start implementing 
their patent laws at the same time.  So what I do is to define five periods accordingly as 
reference periods.  I group the countries that started their pharmaceutical patent laws as 
similar times together. 
¶124 And another key concern is the endogeneity, which is your reverse causality of 
national patent laws.  As some of the previous panelists said, a lot of countries 
implemented patent laws when they actually have more innovations to be patented.  So 
that could be the reverse causality if we just look at the correlation of figures between 
patent law and the innovation level. 
¶125 So to overcome that -- let me talk a few more words about this reverse causality 
first. 
¶126 So why do we think that patent policy could be endogenous, which means it could 
be deterministic by the domestic circumstances.  So since the '80s USA and Western 
nations pressed developing countries to implement patent laws.  So to some extent this is 
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an outside force forcing these developing countries to implement their patent law, so in 
that sense it could say these patent implementations is some sort of running shock.  But to 
the extent that patent implementation is still voluntary, and a lot of countries like Japan, 
Switzerland and China excluded pharmaceutical industries from their national patent law 
at the beginning, also reflects that country has the decision making power and that they 
could base their patent implementation on their local conditions.  So that's the 
endogeneity part that I tease out using the matched algorithm. 
¶127 So what I do is to use a statistical method to match the countries that newly 
implemented patent laws in the pharmaceutical industry with one country that never had 
patent protection up to that reference period and another country that always had patent 
protection, so basically I'm making two weight comparisons.  So I compare each country 
that has just implemented pharmaceutical patent laws with a country that never had 
patent protection and with another country that always had patent protection, and I do this 
two-way comparison to check the robustness of results. 
¶128 And how I constructed my sample countries is that I first identified the set of 
countries who implemented pharmaceutical patent laws during the two decades I have 
data on, and with that I use different legal documents and some previous literary research 
to identify these countries.  And then I matched these countries with the other countries I 
just mentioned according to the country's characteristics.  So that included development 
level, GDP, GDP per capita, PPP, price control policies in the pharmaceuticals, 
pharmaceutical industry outputs and employment, the size of the industry for that 
particular country, and then education levels, et cetera. 
¶129 So after that I came up with this table of matched countries.  So here China 
implements its domestic pharmaceutical patent law in 1991, and I match it to India which 
didn't have patent law for these periods.  So India didn't implement pharmaceutical until 
much later, in the end of 1999, 2000.  So India is the control country in my sample. 
¶130 And then let's look at Brazil in 1996. Oh, I remember, Brazil implemented 
domestic patent laws in pharmaceutical industry in 1997 so it's after the time where I 
have corresponding lateral year innovation outcome measured, so it is also in the control 
group.  It is in one of the control groups there.  Okay, we can find it later.  These are the 
several countries that always had patent laws up until that -- you know, before that 
reference period. 
¶131 So basically I'm comparing the innovation outcomes a few years, one year after the 
implementation up to ten year after for these treatment countries. 
¶132 And I'll skip this.  This is just some details of how to match the samples. 
¶133 Let me just say with one slide why I used the U.S. patent cited -- citation-weighted 
U.S. patent awards as an estimate for innovation.  So first of all patent count and R&D 
expenditure are highly correlated in cross-section, and the shifts of R&D concord with 
patenting level.  So we can think of R&D as innovative input and patents awarded in the 
U.S. as innovation output.  So both are very good innovation outcomes.  Both are very 
good innovation estimates. 
¶134 The U.S. patent counts can provide a uniform base for comparison across countries.  
So because we are dealing with a lot of countries in the sample and each country has their 
own patent, general patent laws.  So if I use the patent awards in domestic country, then 
the country that never had any patent -- never had patent laws would have zero count in 
patent counts, right?  So it makes the comparison unscientific, so that's why I used the 
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U.S., the patents awarded to the innovators in each country that are taken up in the U.S. 
patent office. And I rest assured as I looked at the data that a lot of innovators from 
different countries took out patents in the U.S. patent office way before they had their 
own domestic patent laws. 
¶135 Around 64 percent of international patents in 1975 are patented in the U.S., and this 
number increased sharply in recent years.  So by using the U.S. patent counts I'm really 
capturing the very important innovations all throughout. 
¶136 And using the citation weight is basically to correct for the quality differences 
among the different patent -- different innovations. And I also control for the propensity 
to patent in the U.S. by controlling for how a country trades with U.S. historically.  So we 
can think of an argument that countries that traded with U.S. more frequently would take 
on more patents in the U.S. because they see more markets, market potentials there.  And 
after taking that into account in the regression than the U.S. patent count can serve as a 
better estimate for the innovation estimate. 
¶137 Let me also talk about my second paper on the impact of counterfeits.  So basically 
I spent almost two years to gather data in China.  I sample shoe companies in China for, 
again, a very long time span, from 1993 to 2004.  I looked at these authentic shoe 
companies' responses to the entrance of their counterfeits, and these authentic shoe 
companies in China includes multinational corporations like Nike, Adidas, et cetera, and 
also the Chinese originated famous brands, to name a few. 
¶138 What I found is when their counterfeits enter the market these authentic companies 
innovate to distinguish themselves better in consumer's minds from the counterfeits.  And 
the type of innovation they engage is to input more advanced technologies in producing 
shoes, from Italy mainly, and they produce better, more sophisticated shoe surfaces, 
better patterns that are harder to imitate, and better materials they use, especially shoe 
surface and shoe bottom, the back.  But the bottom part of the shoe actually we see least 
changed as the counterfeits enter.  And they raise their authentic prices accordingly to 
accommodate the cost increase due to more advanced material and technology, and also 
they've raised their prices about a level that's captured in the cost change to signal their 
quality. 
¶139 Interestingly they also invested in their own enforcement.  They established their 
own brand protection offices where they would send their own employees to monitor the 
market and they would report to the government where they found fake shoes and the 
government would help them to track these counterfeits down.  And there is where the 
relationship comes in to play most.  So a company that has better relationship with the 
government gets more immediate attention in tracking down counterfeits. 
¶140 And they also do vertical integration, by which I mean they established their 
company store instead of doing retailing, instead of selling to the retailer. 
¶141 And all these are quite effective in helping them deterring counterfeit. 
¶142 So thank you very much, and I would like to discuss with you more. 
¶143 (Applause.) 
¶144 MS. HO:  Thank you to our panelist for not only a fascinating discussion but 
making my job very easy as the timekeeper.  I thought I was moving people along, but 
you're all done. 
¶145 So we have a good amount of time for discussion, so I'd like to open it up for 
questions that people have. 
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¶146 MR. OROZCO:  My question is for Ben.  Thinking about the issue of getting 
damages or just putting some teeth into the enforcement in China, who has the burden to 
conduct this factual discovery to ascertain what is the damages question and how does 
that technical hurdle impact what is the ultimate question of the judiciary figuring what 
the damages issue is? 
¶147 MR. BAI:  Excellent question.  We heard again and again even if you win in China 
you're not going to get much money.  That's actually true because plaintiff has the burden 
to prove not only infringement but also damages.  Damages are normally calculated in 
the following order:  Lost profit to the right holder or infringer's gain; or the next one is 
reasonable royalty for patent cases and some other case but not for all; then the last 
category is what's called statutory damages, which are now capped at 500,000 RMB, 
which is about $60,000.  So that's the sequence of determining damages. 
¶148 If you don't operate in China then you have no lost profit, so really what you're 
looking for is reasonable royalty.  Reasonable royalty has to be reasonable in China.  So 
if you get 10 percent in the U.S. or Europe, the judges will say I'm not going to listen to 
these kind of evidence.  This is purely protectionism at its best.  But are they entitled to 
do that?  Totally. 
¶149 So the point is if you don't have evidence of your own loss, and for whatever 
litigation strategies you decided not to produce your loss because you may not have 
enough -- you may not have proof to show that, then infringer's gain is the criteria.  Of 
course, there is no discovery so how do you prove that.  You can discover infringer's 
profit if there is a criminal proceeding or an administrative proceeding where they seize 
their books.  And in China they keep several books, so you have to the seize the right 
book. 
¶150 I'm not joking.  It is very complicated to do business in China.  It amazes me that a 
lot of companies make tons of money in China.  GE makes billions of dollars in China, 
Dow Chemical makes billions of dollars in China.  Nokia.  China is Nokia's largest 
market.  I don't understand how they actually make that much money with all these 
complexities.  The point is if you can't discover the infringer's gain, then you're stuck 
with statutory damages, which is $60,000.  And as you read cases coming out of China, a 
lot of times -- for example, 3M cases, $60,000. 
¶151 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:  This is probably a question that's completely 
ridiculous. 
¶152 A couple years ago on the news I remember being told in trademarks, for example, 
it was a big problem because most people from here were saying the Chinese government 
is not enforcing trademarks, not enforcing a lot of things like that. When the Beijing 
Olympics came along they opened a lot of different stores over there and they used their -
- 
¶153 MR. BAI:  I'm sorry.  I can't hear you. 
¶154 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:  The Olympics, the Beijing Olympics of 2008, the 
government actually for the first time opened stores and held, that's what I'm not sure, I 
don't know, but they held some trademarks, and for the first time back then they would 
have enforced differently and personally trademarks through a different method.  And 
I've never heard anything more about this story, but could you comment on has 
enforcement over the years, over the last ten years in regard, for example, trademarks, 
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and is the Chinese government now that it is producing goods are they changing the way 
they view this generally? 
¶155 MR. BAI:  Well, in terms of chasing down counterfeits when it comes to 
trademark, they are ramping up their efforts.  They probably have more people combating 
counterfeits more than any other country. 
¶156 In terms of judicial enforcement, I really don't think -- it's not like as the Olympics 
is approaching they're going to ramp up the enforcement issue.  A lot of trademark 
problems I can go on and on and give you war stories about the mistakes made by U.S. 
trademark lawyers when they advise their clients overseas. 
¶157 U.S. is opposite to the world in many regards.  First-to-file versus first-to-invent, 
use-based trademark rights versus first use first. I'll give you a good example.  I have to 
talk about Viagra.  Viagra -- when Pfizer -- I mean, I hope you're not recording because 
Pfizer is a client of ours, but we had nothing to do with the trademark matter.  When they 
went to China they just got some Chinese trademark agent apply the Chinese mark based 
on the phonetic sound of Viagra, and some Chinese knock-off artist came along and said, 
"My gosh, I'm going to register "Big Brother."  In Chinese it's called "Way Good."  But it 
has a very strong masculine connotation, "Big Brother."  I am going to register this mark 
as my mark.  And Pfizer discovered that and they said, "Oh, good, this mark is really 
good.  I'm going to sue them and get the mark back."  Guess what, they lost.  It is first-to-
file.  Whoever files first wins the game. 
¶158 And if I -- I mean, we can go through all the analytical steps and we'll conclude 
Pfizer will lose.  Pfizer should lose because it is first-to-file system.  You didn't think 
about the catch name, so it is your fault. 
¶159 So I can give you many, many stories where U.S. trademark lawyers, U.S. patent 
lawyers made mistakes based on U.S. mentality.  And when you go overseas, especially 
China, it basically treads foot on them.  I mean, that is a good example of that.  If you 
thought about a better way to, you know. 
¶160 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:  But the fact that China, for example, is producing 
brands of cars and producing its own product and all sorts of new development, does that 
affect the way the government and the people -- I mean, when you're enforcing somebody 
else's trademarks it's one thing, but when you're enforcing your own are they taking a 
different position, are they being more pro-Chinese when they're in court than with 
foreigners? 
¶161 MR. BAI:  Well, you're definitely correct in terms of when -- in fact, Chinese 
enforcement is going to be driven by the domestic industries.  We wanted to target -- I 
represent a lot of multinational companies in China.  We want to target this flagship -- I 
can't name the name.  But this flagship company, which is a private-owned company, it 
has nothing to do with the government.  Just because they represent the Chinese domestic 
industry, if we sue them for patent infringement and we probably going to get some local 
protectionism or some government intervention.  So this is the part when people say 
China doesn't protect IP.  Perhaps, you know, the government, the judiciary is not totally 
independent, so this is going to have a long time to get to neutrality. 
¶162 And also this company happens to be the company that has largest patent portfolio.  
So if we sue them with one patent, they probably going to sue us with ten patents.  So this 
is the emerging trend which I didn't get a chance to discuss.  I thank you for actually 
bringing it up.  So we are very nervous if we sue them, and we told the client perhaps we 
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shouldn't.  And turns out the client got sued by a bigger target so we're fighting that war, 
so we said let's just put this on hold.  Now it's two foreign companies fighting patent 
infringement suit in China.  So this is another emerging trend, is a lot of multinational 
companies are going to start to kill each other in Chinese courts. 
¶163 MS. QIAN:  If I may add a few things.  From my research on that counterfeit piece 
of work, from the data I collected on relationships between an authentic shoe company 
and the Chinese government, there is absolutely no significant difference between the 
multinational corporations' relationship with the government and the local Chinese 
company's relationship with the government. 
¶164 And if I can stretch a bit and relate to another piece of work I'm doing with two co-
authors we're looking at foreign direct investment performance in China.  In that we look 
at whether ethnicity has any advantage.  So the hypothesis is the ethnic Chinese investors 
will do better in China.  But now our results do not show that.  So foreign, mature foreign 
investors, investors not from Hong Kong, Taiwan or Macau, they're doing very well in 
China, especially in recent years. 
¶165 And also in the Olympics question.  Now Chinese government is doing a lot of 
education in response to Olympics and copyright issues, because one thing in the 
previous several months a lot of small businesses actually infringed on trademarks 
unconsciously.  So what they were trying to do is simply to congratulate Olympics to 
come very quickly, and a lot of restaurants do that in their restaurant door, and that 
actually constituted trademark because they were not sponsor of the Olympic so they 
could not use that Olympic Beijing trademark.  So what the Chinese government do is to 
send policemen to educate a lot of the local small business and they broadcast TV 
programs especially talking about copyright issues and the origin of Olympics, et cetera. 
¶166 UNIDENTIFIED VOICE:  I'm wondering of the cases -- this is to Dr. Bai. 
¶167 So the cases you talked about, are all three of them American companies? 
¶168 MR. BAI:  The three cases that I briefly talked about?  One is a German company, 
one is U.S. -- the rest of them are U.S. companies. 
¶169 UNIDENTIFIED VOICE:  I'm just wondering, because the IP issue in China 
doesn't only impact U.S.  I mean, we're in U.S. but the rest of Asia actually probably get 
damage even more severe.  I'm wondering, you know, if you see like -- is there any suit 
actually brought by local, for example, Korea or Taiwan or Central Hong Kong, or are 
they at the same level in terms of going to court?  Or if that's the case did you see a trend 
of preferential treatment, not necessarily in terms of result but in term of speedy trial or 
something or additional data? 
¶170 MR. BAI:  I think as soon as a foreign party shows up the judges become a lot 
more careful.  They will take longer time to render decisions and if necessary they will 
call their boss and say, "How should I rule?"  This is the reality of Chinese judiciary. 
¶171 I don't think there is a whole lot of difference between, say, the Asian foreign 
companies versus the European or Americans companies.  Honda is actively litigating 
cases.  Toyota.  Talk to Toyota and they will paint you very gloomy pictures of how 
horrible things are in China, however they're making tons of monies so I really cannot 
feel sorry for them. 
¶172 A lot of the cases you read about -- I can't really talk about GM because GM is our 
client. Toyota is our client too so I can't really comment on that.  But if we look at even 
their own pictures of -- I mean, Toyota's in-house counsel -- I saw a presentation by 
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Toyota's in-house counsel showing serious counterfeiting issues in China.  I looked at the 
picture and I said, "I'm an average consumer.  I drive a Toyota.  I don't think there is 
actually that close." 
¶173 So before you really believe what people tell you, really dig deeper and look at the 
facts and see for yourself whether there is really infringement or not.  I looked at Toyota's 
slide and I said, "Well, I'm an IP lawyer but I'm also an average consumer.  I really don't 
think -- you know, this is 50/50." 
¶174 So, yes.  I mean, it is a long-winded answer to your short question.  Yes, there are 
companies.  Japanese companies are extremely active in China. 
¶175 MS. HO:  In the back. 
¶176 UNIDENTIFIED VOICE:  A couple of questions about patents in China.  First, 
that two-year statute of limitations.  Does the bar, the start of the clock, is that related to 
the problems related to discovery?  That is do you need like really, really clear and 
convincing evidence for that clock to start running? 
¶177 MR. BAI:  I'm sorry.  I didn't hear the whole question. 
¶178 UNIDENTIFIED VOICE:  You talk about the evidentiary problems with actually 
getting a case that you can win on infringement, and there is also a pretty tight time line 
in terms of the statute of limitations from when you know or should have known that you 
were being infringed.  Are those two related?  That is, is the standard for when the statute 
of limitations starts related to how strong a case you can build given that you don't have 
discovery? 
¶179    MR. BAI:  Well, the clock starts to tick when you know or should have known -- 
the should have known is really the sinister part.  It starts to tick regardless whether you 
have evidence or not. So long as there is a suspicion of infringement you're starting the 
clock ticking.  One way to hold the limitation is -- this shocked me when I heard it the 
first time as a U.S. practitioner.  You can hold a statute of limitation by sending a 
warning letter. But then by sending a warning letter you may trigger the DJ action, 
declaratory judgment, so you have to be careful how you draft the letter so that you can 
buy some time and on the other hand avoid declaratory judgment.  So it is a very fine 
balance. 
¶180 Normally I don't tell people there are ways to hold the clock because if you don't do 
it right then you actually shoot yourself in the foot. So I say this:  Don't try this at home. 
¶181 Did I answer your question? 
¶182 UNIDENTIFIED VOICE:  Yes.  And I have another question.  How does it work 
with process patents? 
¶183 MR. BAI:  Process patents?  Excellent question. 
¶184 There are two kinds.  If your process made a new product, new not -- not in the 
sense of novel, just new at the time, at the time you filed this patent application, new 
meaning new composition, new characteristics, it doesn't have to be patentably new, then 
the burden of proof shifts to the other side.  You file the lawsuit based on the fact that it is 
a process claim, plus you do have to prove it's new, and then you're all set. The infringers 
have to come forward with evidence to show that you are using a different process. 
However, if your process is new but making the same old product that everybody else is 
making, then you're in trouble.  It is very hard. 
¶185 MS. HO:  In the back. 
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¶186 MR. OROZCO:  Can any of you comment on this special IP jurisdiction that has 
been created recently, I think in the special zone called Pudong. Is that the name of it? 
¶187 MR. BAI:  I'm not sure I know what you're talking about. 
¶188 MR. OROZCO:  There is this new type of IP specialized court, I believe, in this 
area. 
¶189 MR. BAI:  When did you read that? 
¶190 MR. OROZCO:  That's in -- that's a book put out by Kellogg called Kellogg on 
China, 2004. 
¶191 MR. BAI:  2004.  No, that's not correct.  In fact, last year Associated Press released 
something that said China created specialized IP courts, and I was interviewed on that.  I 
said this is totally not true. 
¶192 In China, what I didn't get a chance to say is there are various divisions within a 
court. There is one division, normally in No. 3, what's called tribunal.  That is IP court.  
IP judges hear nothing but IP cases.  That has been the case for years, there is nothing 
new about that. 
¶193 One day Chinese Supreme Court said we going to call these courts IPs, and this is 
just a change in the name, nothing substantive.  So people got excited about that and said 
China has created a specialized IP court.  No, that is really not true. 
¶194 In terms of Pudong, if you're referring to Pudong, there is a high tech park where 
they are actively promoting the protection of IP.  Lately they started an IP protection 
forum where there is a service provider and there are government agencies to foster 
innovation and also IP services.  I was actually there at the ceremony because our firm is 
part of the service providers, but I don't know whether that is what you're you talking 
about. 
¶195 MR. OROZCO:  It must be.  What is the unique role of this organization? 
¶196 MR. BAI:  Well, Zhangjiang High Tech Park is poised to be the next Silicon Valley 
in China.  The Shanghai government is extremely smart in managing this area.  They 
said, well, to be successful as the next Silicon Valley I've got to attract the VCs to come 
here, I've got to attract the international law firms to come here, so everything has to be 
up to the international standards, so are IP protections. 
¶197 So they actually invite law firms to participate.  And they invite local law firms as 
well as international law firms.  There is not really a specialized court there.  It is really 
just a way to stimulate innovation. 
¶198 In that park there is a lot of research centers by multinational companies as well as 
Chinese biotech and pharmaceutical companies.  In the next five years you're going to see 
some of those companies going IPO either in the Hong Kong stock exchange or London 
stock exchange, and perhaps NASDAQ.  Many millionaires will be made in the next five 
years. 
¶199 MS. HO:  Did you want to say anything else? 
¶200 MR. LEV:  No.  Just thanks to our sponsors at Foley & Lardner for being the 
Premier sponsor and providing the refreshments.  Have fun.  And also to Jones Day and 
McDonnell Boehnen for sponsoring the panels.  And also to Fish & Richardson, Brinks 
Hofer, and Welsh & Katz for being associates.  Enjoy. 
¶201 Thank you very much. 
¶202 (Applause.) 
¶203 (The panel discussion, and the symposium, were concluded.) 
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